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Cooperative and noncooperative games have no representation of players's
basis utilities. Basis utility is the natural reference point on a player's util-
ity scale that enables the determination the marginal utility of any payo®
or allocation. A player's basis utility can be determined by an observer
and other players under standard rationality assumptions. Basis utility al-
lows interpersonal comparison of proportional utility gains relative to the
disagreement outcome. Proportional pure bargaining is the unique solu-
tion satisfying e±ciency, symmetry, a±ne transformation invariance and
monotonicity in pure bargaining games with basis utility. Characteriza-
tion of the Nash (1950) bargaining solution requires the assumption of the
irrelevance of basis utility in games with basis utility. All existing cooper-
ative solution functions become translation invariant once proper account
is taken of basis utility. The noncooperative rationality of these results is
demonstrated with a proportional bargaining based on Gul (1988). Fur-
ther noncooperative application is demonstrated by showing that quantal
response equilibria with multiplicative error structures (Goeree, Holt and
Palfrey (2004)) become translation invariant with speci¯cation of basis
utility.
JEL Classi¯cation: C70, C71, C72, C78. Keywords: Basis utility, equal split, Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution, Nash bargaining, quantal response equilibria, proportional bar-
gaining, translation invariance.
¤Thanks to Peter Borm, Oliver Gossner, Srihari Govindan, Elena I~ narra, David K. Levine, Chris
O'Neill and Alvin E. Roth for comments or discussions related to this paper. c °2006 by Barry
Feldman.1 Introduction
A cooperative or noncooperative game is a concise mathematical representation of a
bargaining problem or strategic interaction. Players in games are generally assumed to
be completely rational. As stated by Nash (1950), this rationality implies that players
have \full knowledge of the tastes and preferences" of the other players. Therefore, a
game must include all information about the value of payo®s or allocations to players
that could be apprehended by a rational player (or observer) that might be of value
to a rational player in the game.
This paper shows that important information about players's preferences is omit-
ted from cooperative and noncooperative games, as currently de¯ned. This informa-
tion can be apprehended by rational players in the game and by rational observers.
The missing information is the basis utility of each player. The basis utility of a player
is the reference point on its utility scale that enables another player or an observer
to determine the marginal utility of a payo® or allocation to that player.
Some might be surprised by the claim that the marginal utilities of payo®s to
players are not determined by the information provided by a game as currently de-
¯ned. Utilities are sometimes treated as if they were marginal utilities. Further, in
experiments the utility of monetary payo®s is often assumed to be equal the cash
value. In this case, payo®s happen to correspond to marginal utilities. However, in
general, when players are assumed to have expected utility functions and no explicit
normalization is provided, it must concluded that marginal utilities are unknown.
In the example of the experiment, the assumption that utility is equal to the cash
value provides the normalization: the basis utility must be zero. If the experimenter
had added 10 to each monetary payo® in the representation of a player's utility, this
would still be a valid representation of the player's preferences. However, we would
not be able to properly infer marginal utilities without knowledge of the translation,
which directly implies that the player's basis utility is now 10.
The example focuses attention on an important property of expected utility func-
tions: translation invariance. Players in games are generally assumed to have ex-
pected utility functions. Adding a constant to an expected utility function does not
change its representation of a player's preferences and does not change any of the
function's decision or game theoretic properties. Basis utility is a point on a player's
utility scale. If the scale is translated by adding a constant, basis utility must obvi-
ously be translated as well.
If player utility functions are translation invariant, than the solution concepts that
determine the outcome of a game should be translation invariant as well. A solution
concept is translation invariant if translation of a player's utility function leads to
an identical translation of its payo® or allocation. Adding 10 to a player's utility
function should lead to its payo® or allocation increasing by 10. This is necessary if
the choice of a particular representation of a player's preferences is to have no e®ect
1on the real outcome of the game.
The Nash (1950) bargaining solution was the ¯rst of many solution concepts that
was derived by including the requirement that the solution should be translation
invariant. A solution function that fails to be translation invariant will be called
translation dependent. Myerson (1991:18) advises that \we should be suspicious any
theory of economic behavior" that is translation dependent. This paper shows that
what appears to be translation dependence in cooperative games is actually basis
utility dependence, or more simply, basis dependence. Many cooperative solution
concepts de¯ned by axioms, including the Nash bargaining solution, are not properly
identi¯ed in games extended to allow identi¯cation of players's basis utilities. These
solutions now require the additional axiom they are not basis dependent.
The principal result of this paper is to show that a large class of solution concepts,
(endogenous) proportional solutions, are translation invariant in games with basis
utility. To illustrate, consider a cooperative game where two players are bargain over
the division of $90. In the event of disagreement, player 1 will receive $10 and player
2 will receive $20. Utility is assumed to be linear in dollars. The proportional solution
gives $30 to player 1 and $60 to player 2. Now add 10 to both players's disagreement
payo®s and 20 to the cooperative outcome (so that, for example, if players split
equally in both cases, their outcomes both increase by 10). Utility is still linear in
money but is no longer equal to the number of dollars. Without recognition of basis
utility, the proportional outcome appears to be 44 for player 1 and 66 for player 2, as
the players will now share on a 20/30 basis. The increase in player 1's payo® is 14 and
the increase in player 2's payo® is 6 and translation invariance fails for both players.
The proportional pure bargaining solution with basis utility (see section 3.3) gives 40
to player 1 and 70 to player 2, the translation invariant solution that corresponds to
the original real outcome.
A related more basic result is that players can make proportional interpersonal
comparisons of utility in games with basis utility. It has been generally understood
that meaningful interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made when individuals
have expected utility functions.1 Recognition of basis utility thus requires a revision
of the understanding of the potential role of interpersonal comparison of utility in
rational bargaining processes.
In the literature on distributive justice going back more than 2000 years, equal
and proportional approaches to bargaining have gone side by side (see, e.g., Young
(1994)). It is odd that one and only one of these approaches should be considered out-
side the realm of rational behavior. Proportional allocation has been well-studied by
social choice theory (e.g., O'Neill (1980), Young (1988) and Moulin (1987)), but has
been largely ignored by game theory. The few exceptions include the proportional nu-
cleolus of Lemaire (1991) and the proportional value of Ortmann (2000) and Feldman
1For example, Myerson (1991:381) writes that translation (and scale) invariance are \... based on
an assumption that only the individual decision-theoretic properties of utility scales should matter,
and [that] interpersonal comparisons of utility have no decision-theoretic signi¯cance [...]."
2(1999, 2001) and Kali's (1977) and Roth's (1979) work on (exogenous) proportional
pure bargaining according to pre-speci¯ed ratios. Other mention of proportional al-
location is rare in the economics and game theoretic literature.2 Recognition of basis
utility \rehabilitates" proportional solutions as a legitimate subject of study by those
working in the rational behavior framework.
Basis utility is formally de¯ned in section 2 of this paper. Standard rationality
assumptions are shown to be su±cient to imply knowledge of a players's basis utilities
and the comparability of proportional gains is established.
Cooperative solutions are ¯rst taken up in section 3, which develops results for
three speci¯c cases: The cooperative equal split bargaining solution, Nash bargain-
ing and proportional pure bargaining. Proportional pure bargaining is shown to be
uniquely characterized by e±ciency, symmetry, transformation invariance and mono-
tonicity in games with basis utility. Conditions are then developed under which all
solutions for the standard characteristic function game are translation invariant.
Section 4 examines noncooperative games. An implementation of proportional
bargaining based on Gul (1988) a±rms the noncooperative rationality of basis util-
ity dependent cooperative solutions. In the limiting case, a player's probability of
selection to propose is proportional to her expected payo®. The equilibrium is trans-
lation invariant when selection probabilities are based on marginal utilities. Basis
dependence shows up in a di®erent noncooperative context in Goeree, Holt and Pal-
frey (2004), who ¯nd that quantal response equilibrium based on response functions
with multiplicative error structures better model experimental data than additive er-
ror models. They consider multiplicative error models to be translation dependent.
These models are shown instead to be basis utility dependent.
Section 5 returns to cooperative pure bargaining. Equal split is characterized
in general pure bargaining games. The similarity of equal split, Kalai-Smorodinsky
(1975) and proportional bargaining and their relationship to the proportional solu-
tions of Kali (1977) and Roth (1979) are considered. Several approaches are o®ered
to structure the expanded universe of pure bargaining solutions.
2 Basis utility
2.1 De¯nition
The standard representations of games abstracts from the real outcomes that generate
utility for players. These outcomes are the true inputs to players's utility functions.
Except in the case of market games, utility functions are generally de¯ned on strategy
spaces in noncooperative games and coalitions in cooperative games. A rudimentary
2See, however, the comments of Aumann and Maschler (1985:210), fn. 26 and Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996:595), fn. 10 on the apparent translation dependence of proportional solutions.
3framework for the description of real outcomes is developed here in order to provide
a clear de¯nition of basis utility.
Let U be the universe of real outcomes. U is constructed from a set of objects O.
An individual object can be a physical object such as a car or a chair or an abstract
good such as the right to receive a certain percentage of the pro¯ts of an undertaking.
Objects may have a quantity dimension, suppressed here for notational simplicity.
Approximately, a real outcome X is a subset of O and U is the set of all such X:
U = fX : X µ Og. Note that ? ½ U, where ? is the empty set. The de¯nition of
real outcomes is imprecise because of the potential for a quantity dimension for an
object. For example, in a bargaining problem involving a certain volume x of water,
water could be the only object in O. In this case, U could be understood to be the
set of all volumes of water from zero to the entire volume. U could thus comprise an
in¯nite number of outcomes.
The utility of a player is de¯ned on U, for any player i, ui : U ! R. The function
ui is considered to be player i's utility as de¯ned by an observer of the game. Each
player j constructs utility scale u
j
i : U ! R for player i.
In a noncooperative game with n players, any pure strategy pro¯le s¤ = (s¤
1;:::;s¤
n)
determines a set of real outcomes X = fXign
i=1. These real outcomes determine the
utility to players of strategy pro¯le s¤, so that ui(s¤) = ui(Xi(s¤)). The utility of
mixed strategies can then be de¯ned in the conventional way.
In cooperative games based on the characteristic function a simple approach that
is su±cient for many situations is to consider that there is a subset O(S) of O available
to every coalition S µ N, where N is the set of players. For each player i and any
allocation Xi(S) to i by coalition S, Xi(S) must be feasible, so that Xi(S) µ O(S).
Further, the set of all allocations by S must also be feasible:
S
i2S Xi(S) µ O(S).
The traditional feasible set of allocations open to coalition S, W(S) ½ RS (\W" for
the worth of coalition S in a cooperative game non-transferrable utility) can then be
generated from the set of feasible real allocations and probability distributions over
this set.3
The basis utility of a player is the utility of receiving no real outcome:
De¯nition 2.1 The basis utility of a player i with utility function ui de¯ned on a
universe of real outcomes U is ui(?).
3These de¯nitions do not cover every possible game structure. For example, a pure strategy
payo® could be a mixture of real outcomes in a noncooperative game. In cooperative games, there
could di®ering costs associated with providing real outcomes to di®erent players (e.g., di®erent
transportation costs) or other reasons why real outcomes might not be completely transferrable.
These examples, however can be handled with simple elaborations of the framework described here.
42.2 Identi¯ability
Standard rationality assumptions imply an observer or players in a game can identify
a player's basis utility. Formally, since a player's utility function ui is de¯ned on
U and ? ½ U it must be that ui(?) is de¯ned. This, however, does not settle the
question of whether identifying basis utility somehow might require a \higher level"
of rationality than the assessment of the utility to a player of other outcomes in U.
As an intuitive matter, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that determining a player's
basis utility could not be any harder than determining the utility of all the other
outcomes in U. Still, since players in existing games are not assumed to make this
assessment, this argument might not be entirely persuasive.
A further argument can be developed around probabilistic outcomes. The utility
of any lottery involving two non-null outcomes is clearly within the conventionally
assumed scope of knowledge of rational players. It is again then intuitive that the
assessing the utility of receiving a non-null outcome with a probability p and nothing
otherwise, a probabilistic outcome, should also be with this scope of knowledge. Basis
utility is then directly inferred.4 However, it could instead be argued that this is
begging the question and that probabilistic outcomes cannot be determined without
knowledge of basis utility.
An apparently bulletproof approach to demonstrating that identifying basis utility
does not require a higher level of rationality on the part of a player or observer is to
consider the utility of a divisible object in a limit process as it \volume" goes to zero.
The object could be a volume of water or wine or the size of a royalty to be paid. The
utility of any individual outcome in this limit process is clearly identi¯able. Let X¹
represent an outcome where ¹ 2 (0;1) is the fraction of X received. Then, making
only the conventional technical assumption of the continuity of ui, limk!1 ui(X1=k)
is player i's basis utility. Note that we can assume that there is an in¯nitely divisible
object X in O even if X is not part of a potential payo® or allocation for any player.
Proposition 2.1 The basis utility of a player is known by all players and observers
in a standard game.
2.3 Interpersonal comparisons of utility
A player's basis utility is a natural common reference point that, in a natural manner,
enables the determination of the marginal utilities to a player of all possible outcomes
to a player. These marginal utilities enable all players and observers to determine the
proportional utility gains of any outcome relative to the player's individually rational
4Assume player (or observer) j assigns u
j
i(Ajp1) as the utility to player i of receiving outcome
A with probability p1 and u
j





i(A) + (1 ¡ pk)U(?), j can clearly infer that i's basis utility, according to j's scale, must be
u
j





5outcome. While players and observers may not construct the same utility scales for
a player, they will compute the same proportional gains. Basis utility thus enables
proportional interpersonal comparisons of utility gains.
Consider a cooperative game in which players have expected utility, with repre-
sentation w for an observer and wj for each participant. These representations are
based on utility scales constructed for each player. Let ui be the utility function for
player i constructed by an observer and let u
j
i be the utility function for i constructed
by player j.
The marginal utility MUi(Z) of a payo® Z to a player i is the player's utility
with the payo® minus the utility without the payo®. The player's utility without the
payo® is the player's basis utility.
De¯nition 2.2 MUi(Z) = ui(Z) ¡ ui(?).
Assume that MUi(Z) is the marginal utility to i of Z according to an observer's
utility scale. Similarly, de¯ne MU
j
i (Z) be this marginal utility according to player
j's utility scale for i.
Proposition 2.2 Consider players i, j and k in a cooperative game w where w(i) 6=
















The ratio of any player's marginal utility for any real outcome to the marginal utility
of the player's individually rational playo® must be the same according to all players
and observers.
Proof: For any player j with representation u
j
i of player i's preferences there must be
constants aj and bj > 0 such that ui = aj+bju
j
i because players have expected utility.
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All ratios are clearly well-de¯ned when w(i) 6= ui(?). ¤
6This simple result is signi¯cant, as the standard understanding is that players in
a game and observers of the game cannot make interpersonal comparisons of player's
utilities.5 Most fundamentally, this means that it is impossible to determine if a real
outcome Z means more to one player than another. This remains true in the absolute
sense: there is no way to tell if i values Z more than does i. However, recognition of
basis utility makes it possible to determine which player would experience the greatest
proportional gain in utility relative to individually rational payo®s. This knowledge
may be relevant to players's evaluation of the fairness of allocations, and, so, enter
into the bargaining process. Recent work by GÄ achter and Riedl (2005) ¯nds that
people commonly utilize proportional comparisons in making normative assessments
about the fairness of distributional outcomes.
3 Cooperative Games
3.1 Soft bargaining and the equal split solution
In the equal split solution players split the payo® equally, irrespective of disagreement
payo®s. This soft bargaining { in contrast the commonly expected hard bargaining
{ might be justi¯ed by fairness considerations that are rational in a larger context.6
Soft bargaining is observed in a variety of experiments, most dramatically in the
ultimatum game.7 This example demonstrates the basis dependence of the equal
split solution and de¯nes key elements of the formal bargaining framework employed
in this paper.
Assume players 1 and 2 can share $100 if they can agree on its division. Otherwise
they receive $10 and $30, respectively. Start with players's utilities de¯ned as equal
to the dollars received. The bargaining game is then B = (d;S), where d = (10;30)
is the disagreement point and S = f(x;y) 2 R2jx + y · 100g is the set of feasible
bargaining outcomes. Refer to d and S as elements of the bargaining game B.
De¯nition 3.1 A bargaining game is symmetric if all comparable elements of the
game are symmetric. All elements are comparable unless speci¯cally excluded from
comparison. An element Z of a bargaining game is symmetric if and only if for any
players i and j in the game and any vector x 2 Z, y 2 Z as well, where yi = xj and
yj = xi and yk = xk for all k 6= i;j.
5See footnote 1. Perhaps the maximum degree of comparability established to date is by Myerson
(1977), who develops conditions under which there must be a pair of transformations according to
which outcomes for players in two-player bargaining games re°ect equal gains. Nash bargaining does
not satisfy the conditions, but proportional bargaining in games with basis utility does.
6See, e.g., Huck and Oechssler (1999) and Lopomo and Ok (2001).
7In the ultimatum game one player makes a take-it or leave-it o®er to another, and each player
receives zero if it is rejected. Equal split does not describe the structure of an ultimatum game, but
the choice between equal split and, say, Nash bargaining provides a useful cooperative perspective.
7De¯nition 3.2 If a cooperative solution is symmetric then all players receive equal
allocations in a symmetric game.
De¯nition 3.3 A cooperative solution is e±cient if, for x = F(d;S), there is no
y 2 S such that y ¸ x and y 6= x.
Proposition 3.1 The TU equal split solution identi¯ed by e±ciency, symmetry and
the noncomparability of disagreement payo®s is basis dependent.
Proof: E±ciency, symmetry and the noncomparability of disagreement payo®s de-
termine ES(B) = (50;50). De¯ne B¤ by adding 100 to player 1's utility function:
B¤ = (d¤;S¤), where d¤ = (110;30) and S¤ = f(x;y) 2 R2jx + y · 200g. The
axioms again imply a symmetric outcome: ES(B¤) = (100;100). But this corre-
sponds to 100 ¡ 100 = $0 for player 1. Translation invariance implies the outcome
(150;50) = ES(B) + (100;0) = (150;50). The basis points of B and B¤ are clearly
(0;0) and (100;0). B¤ is no longer symmetric if basis utility is made a comparable
element. Translation of B¤ to make it symmetric restores the proper allocations. ¤
Representation of the basis point allows for a natural transformation invariant
representation of equal split. This is done now for the case of linear utility functions.
Generalization to general pure bargaining games is deferred to theorem 5.1.
De¯nition 3.4 A proper n-player pure bargaining game is represented by the triple
B = (»;d;S), where » 2 RN is the basis point, d 2 RN is the disagreement point,
S ½ RN is the set of feasible alternatives and RN is the n-dimensional space indexed
by the set N of the n players i = 1;:::;n.
De¯nition 3.5 Direct or Hadamard multiplication is represented by the symbol ¯.
If a and b are both n-vectors, then a ¯ b = (a1 b1;a2 b2;:::;an bn). If a 2 RN and B
is a subset of Rn, then a ¯ B = fx 2 Rnj y 2 B and x = a ¯ yg.
De¯nition 3.6 Direct addition and subtraction are represented by the symbols © and
ª. If a 2 RN and B is a subset of Rn, then a © B = fx 2 Rnj y 2 B and x = a + yg
and direct subtraction is de¯ned analogously. Direct multiplication has precedence.
De¯nition 3.7 A solution F for a proper n-player pure bargaining game B = (»;d;S)
is a±ne transformation invariant if and only if F(s ¯ » + c;s ¯ d + c;s ¯ S © c) =
s ¯ F(»;d;S) + c for any s > 0N 2 RN and c 2 RN.
Proposition 3.2 Assume, in a two-player bargaining game B = (»;d;S), that the
e±cient surface of S is linear and that the bargaining solution is e±cient, symmetric,
8independent of individual payo®s and a±ne transformation invariant. Let the max-
imum utility obtainable by player 1 while player 2 obtains at least »2 be M1 and the
similar maximum for player 2 be M2. The solution is then the equal split solution











Proof: First translate utilities so that the basis point is zero. Then rescale so that
players's utility is one-to-one transferrable by multiplication with constants x =
(1;(M1 ¡»1)=(M2 ¡»2)). Symmetry gives the outcome (1=2(M1 ¡»1);1=2(M1 ¡»1)):
Reverse transformation completes the proof. ¤
3.2 The Nash bargaining solution
Changes in basis utility have no e®ect on the Nash (1950) bargaining solution. How-
ever, in proper pure bargaining games this independence must be assumed since it
cannot be inferred from Nash's axioms of e±ciency, symmetry, transformation invar-
iance and independence from irrelevant alternatives8
Let xN be the 1 £ n vector with xN
i = x for all i 2 N. The game normalized so
that the disagreement point is 0N and the Nash solution is 1N can no longer be made
symmetric by IIA in the sense of de¯nition 3.1 because it cannot be guaranteed that
basis utility will be symmetric as well.
Proposition 3.3 Characterization of the Nash bargaining solution in a proper pure
bargaining game B = (»;d;S) requires that basis utility be declared a noncomparable
element of the game.
Basis utility is readily identi¯ed in Nash's (1950) detailed bargaining example in
which two players, Bill and Jack, bargain over personal items. Table 1 reports the
utility of these items to each player. Nash assumes utilities are additive. This is a
strong assumption in as much as it not only requires that there are no external e®ects,
but that utilities are marginal utilities as well. This implies that the basis point in
the example is » = (0;0). When the game is normalized the basis point becomes
»¤ = (¡1;¡1:2). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
If the reported utilities need not be marginal utilities, then translating Bill's utili-
ties adding one to each outcome would have no e®ect on the real bargain reached. The
Nash solution of the original game is (24;11) for Bill and Jack. In the transformed
8Independence of irrelevant alternatives in proper pure bargaining games requires that if B =
(»;d;S), B¤ = (»;d;S), S ½ T, x = F(B¤) and x 2 S, then x = F(B).
9game the outcome is (30;10:33). Translation invariance is clearly violated because
Jack's utility changes.9
3.3 Proportional bargaining
Kalai (1977) and Roth (1979) study a type of proportional solution that is indepen-
dent of basis utility. Individual worths are normalized to zero so that the feasibility
set completely represents the standard pure bargaining game. Kalai's principal result
is that a solution that is weakly Pareto optimal, homogeneous (i.e., cF(S) = F(cS)
for c > 0), strongly individually rational and monotonic must be proportional. Strik-
ingly, however, the proportions are exogenously determined.
Social choice models of endogenous proportional allocation where individual worths
determine relative shares are studied by O'Neill (1980), Moulin (1987) and Young
(1988). There have been no endogenous proportional pure bargaining solutions similar
to these models. Representation of basis utility allows the disagreement point to
determine an endogenous vector of proportionality. Since individual worths are the
only measure of the strength of players in a pure bargaining game, this result has an
obvious natural interpretation.
The set S of feasible bargaining outcomes is required to be convex, compact,
comprehensive and nonlevel. Comprehensive means that if y 2 S and x < y, then
x 2 S as well. Nonlevel means that if x is a weakly e±cient allocation, then it must
be (strongly) e±cient as well. That is, if x 2 S and there is no y 2 S such that y > x,
then there is no y 2 S such that y ¸ x and y 6= x.
De¯nition 3.8 The proportional solution for the proper bargaining game B = (»;d;S)




; i = 1;2;:::;n: (1)
De¯nition 3.9 A bargaining solution F is monotonic if and only if given any two
proper pure bargaining games B = (»;d;S) and B¤ = (»;d;T) where S ½ T, F(B¤) ¸
F(B).
Theorem 3.1 The proportional bargaining solution is the unique pure bargaining so-
lution that is e±cient (def. 3.3), symmetric (def. 3.2), a±ne transformation invariant
(def. 3.7) and monotonic in all proper pure bargaining games with d > ».
9In the original game Bill gives Jack the book, whip, ball and bat. Jack gives Bill the pen, toy
and knife. In the transformed game, with 1/3 probability the original solution obtains and with 2/3
probability the exchange is the same except that Bill keeps his ball.
10Proof: Create a normalized game B¤ = (»¤;d¤;S¤) from B = (»;d;S) where d > »
with »¤ = 0N and d¤ = 1N as follows. Let S0 = Sª» (def. 3.6). Then de¯ne ± = d¡»
and let S¤ = ±¡1 ¯ S0, where ±¡1 = (1=±1;1=±2;:::;1=±n).
De¯ne c = maxfcj c1N 2 S¤g. Let ¼i be an n-vector with ¼i
i = c + ², ² > 0,
and ¼i
j = 0 for j 6= i. De¯ne T to be the comprehensive set based on the convex hull
generated by the points fc1N;¼1;¼2;:::;¼ng. Choose ² small enough that T ½ S¤
and note that c1N 2 T and T is symmetric with respect to players. By symmetry
cN = F(0N;1N;T). Monotonicity now requires that cN = F(0N;1N;S¤). Any other
outcome will require at least one player to receive less than c.
Restoring the utility scales of the original game, we ¯nd that, for every player i,
Fi(»;d;S) = (di ¡ »i)c + »i, or c = (Fi(»;d;S) ¡ »i)=(di ¡ »i) for every player i. ¤
Remark 3.1 Proportional bargaining is de¯ned here only for games where d > ».
With little work, the solution can be extended to games where d ¸ » through a limit
argument. In these games di = »i implies Fi(»;d;S) = »i so long as there is at least
one player j with dj > »j. The allocation to these players is the same as the bargaining
game without the players i that have di = »i.
Remark 3.2 Proportional solutions for the case where there exists a di < »i are
problematic. If there is also a dj > »j, then the arguments of theorem 3.1 do not carry
through because a±ne transformation cannot create a symmetric bargaining problem
and there is no hint of a solution. On the other hand, if there is no dj > »j and
d < », the bargaining problem can be made symmetric and the arguments of theorem
3.1 hold. However, the result is unacceptable. The lower the disagreement outcome
relative to a player's basis utility, the stronger the player becomes. This is because
proportional solutions re°ect magnitudes but cannot re°ect signs.
3.4 General cooperative games
The worth of the null coalition currently conveys no information. One way to repre-
sent basis utility in coalitional games is to let the null coalition represent the basis
point. In continuity with the notation already used, let w(?) = ».
De¯nition 3.10 A game w in proper characteristic function form is a set function
from the coalitions S ½ 2N, S 6= ?, to RS, with w(?) ´ ».
Note that a±ne transformation of the characteristic function requires that the
worth of the null coalition must be transformed as well. This de¯nition simpli¯es for
transferrable utility games. Any game in proper form has a marginal representation.
11De¯nition 3.11 Let w be a proper game with w(?) = » 2 RN. Let w¤ be the
marginal form of w. For any coalition S ½ N, let »S be the restriction of » to the
players in S, with »? ´ 0. Then w¤(S) = w(S) ª »S (def. 3.6).
In a marginal form game w¤(?) = 0N. Proposition 2.1 shows that all player
and observers know the basis point in a game. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
assume that » = 0N unless explicitly stated otherwise, and, hence, that the standard
characteristic function is, e®ectively, a marginal form game.
De¯nition 3.12 A solution function is in marginal form if it does not reference the
basis point.
De¯nition 3.13 Let Á¤ be a solution function with marginal form and let w be a
cooperative game in proper characteristic function form with w(?) = » and marginal





The result of the application of a solution function in marginal form to a proper
form game is de¯ned to be the solution on the marginal form game plus the basis point.
The marginal form is directly analogous to the 0-normalized standard characteristic
function game. The proper form of the solution function can now be inferred. The
following proposition trivially follows.
Proposition 3.4 All marginal form solutions are translation invariant.
De¯nition 3.14 Let Á be a solution function de¯ned on proper characteristic func-
tion games. Let v = w, except that w(?) 6= w(?). Basis utilities change in v. If
Á(v) = Á(w) for any game w and any value w(?), then Á is basis independent.
Proposition 3.5 The property identi¯ed as translation invariance in standard form
games without representation of basis utility is actually basis independence.
Proof: If a solution appears translation invariant in standard characteristic function
games, it must be independent of basis utility as the implied basis point is always
(0;0), even after translation. If a solution is basis dependent, it must appear trans-
lation dependent because the implied basis point is not subjected to translation. ¤
124 Noncooperative games
The principal task of this section is to demonstrate the noncooperative rationality
of basis utility with a translation invariant model of proportional bargaining. Ad-
ditionally, quantal response equilibrium is shown to provide a pure noncooperative
application of basis utility. There is at least one prior point of contact between basis
utility and noncooperative games. A player in the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) model
of the consistent NTU value that is `removed' due to a breakdown in negotiations
receives zero terminal payo®. This payo® must function like the player's basis utility
if the game is be translation invariant.
4.1 Noncooperative proportional bargaining
Proportional bargaining (th. 3.1) is modeled using the basic setup developed by Gul
(1998) to implement the Shapley value. Two players are endowed with productive
assets that yield an income stream. In each time period, a player is selected to bid
a constant stream of payments for the other's resources. If the bid is accepted, the
bidder receives the assets of the acceptor, the acceptor receives the promised payments
and bargaining ends. If the bid is rejected, this stage game repeats.
Let w(12) be the worth of the joint assets, let w(1) and w(2) be the individual
worths and let w(?) = (»1;»2). The game must be superadditive: w(12) > w(1) +
w(2). The common discount factor is ±, with 0 < ± < 1. Let ci
t be the value of
the assets owned by player i at time t. The utility provided to player i at time t is
de¯ned to be (1¡±)ci
t. The present discounted utility at time t0 to player i given an








t¡t0 (1 ¡ ±)c
i
t: (2)
The selection of players to propose di®ers from the Gul model. Both players
submit bids before the bidder is selected. The probability of selecting player i to bid
is set proportional to player j's bid for i's assets. This selection procedure can be
seen as a natural way to re°ect the impact of a player's strength on the bargaining
process. Let b
ji
t be the bid by player j for i's assets at time t. The probability pi
t of

















Computing probabilities based on the marginal utility of bids makes selection prob-
abilities independent of the translation of players's utility scales.
13Given that no bid has been accepted, the complete history of the game prior to






k=1 . The complete set of all such possible histories prior





t), where i will accept any bid b
ji
t ¸ ri
t if j is selected to bid.
Let ¾i
t contain a single strategy for each possible history to time t ¡ 1. A complete
strategy for i is §i = (¾i
t)t=1
t=1 , the set of all strategy pro¯les is § = §1 £ §2 and a
complete description of the game is then ¡1 = (§;(U1;U2);w;±).
Theorem 4.1 In the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of ¡1 i o®ers j
¹ b
ij = ±
w(j) ¡ »j Pi=2
i=1 w(i) ¡ »i
(w(12) ¡ »1 ¡ »2) + (1 ¡ ±)(w(j) ¡ »j) + »j;
and ¹ rj = ¹ bij. The expected utilities during bargaining and at any time t before a bidder
is selected are the allocations determined by proportional pure bargaining (eq. 1)
¹ U
i =
w(i) ¡ »i Pj=2
j=1 w(j) ¡ »j
(w(12) ¡ »1 ¡ »2) + »i; i = 1;2:
Proof: Considering stationary strategies, history is irrelevant and each player com-
putes optimal strategies under the assumption that if the current bid is rejected that
agreement will be reached in the next time period. Expected utility before selection










ji; i = 1;2; j 6= i:
Equilibrium bids are player's continuation values and are the solution of the equations
¹ b
ij = ± ¹ U
j + (1 ¡ ±)w(j); i = 1;2; j 6= i:
¤
Proposition 4.1 The game ¡1 is translation invariant.
Proof: Let w¤(?) = »¤ = (»1 + x;»2), w¤(12) = w(12) + x, w¤(1) = w(1) + x and
w¤(2) = w(2). Then ¹ bji¤ = ¹ bji + x, ¹ Ui¤ = ¹ Ui + x, ¹ bij¤ = ¹ bij and ¹ Uj¤ = ¹ Uj. ¤
Remark 4.1 Theorem 4.1 easily generalizes to n-player pure bargaining games.
14Remark 4.2 Selection probabilities can be based on the average of both players's
proposals, e.g., pi = (bji + bii)=((bji + bii) + (bij + bjj)). The outcome in the limit,
as ± ! 1, is the same. However, expected utility for ± < 1 is no longer exactly the
proportional solution.
Remark 4.3 Complete translation invariance can easily be shown in (NTU) hyper-
plane games, and with some work, in general NTU games.
Remark 4.4 A TU and NTU implementation of proportional pure bargaining based
on the game of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) is included in Feldman (2002).
4.2 Quantal response equilibria
Quantal response equilibria (QRE) are a re¯nement introduced by McKelvey and Pal-
frey (1995). \Trembles" or misperceptions of payo®s cause deviations from best re-
sponse and are modeled with a statistical response function. Under general conditions
a unique equilibrium is selected as the size of trembles goes to zero. QRE is de¯ned
with an additive error structure. This guarantees translation invariance. Goeree,
Holt and Palfrey (2004) (GHP) introduce regular QRE. One feature of these equilib-
ria is that they allow a multiplicative error structure, which the authors ¯nd provides
a better ¯t to experimental data. GHP consider the multiplicative error model to
be translation dependent and thus that \[t]ranslation invariance is not plausible in
settings where the magnitudes of perception errors or preference shocks depend on
the magnitudes of expected payo®s." (2004:19.)
A regular n-player QRE for may be de¯ned as follows. Let Si = (si1;si2;:::;siJi),
be i's pure strategy set, where Ji is the number of i's pure strategies. Let ¾i 2 §i be
a mixed strategy over Si, let ¾ 2 § be a complete pro¯le of mixed strategies, and let
¾¡i represent the strategy pro¯le of all players except i. Player i's expected payo®
from a strategy pro¯le ¾ is ¼i(¾).
Represent undisturbed payo®s as a function of strategy choice to any i given ¾¡i
by the function ¹ ¼i(¾) = (¼i(si1;¾¡i);¼i(si2;¾¡i);:::;¼i(siJi;¾¡i)). Collect the ¹ ¼i into
the pro¯le ¹ ¼(¾) = (¼1(¾);¼2(¾);:::;¼n(¾)). Player i's perceived payo® from strategy
j, ^ ¼ij(sij;¾¡i), is a®ected by a privately observed random disturbance that may be a
function of her strategy choice: ^ ¼ij(sij;¾¡i) = g(¹ ¼i(sij;¾¡i);²ij).
Let Pi : ¹ ¼i ! §i be the regular quantal response function for player i. The regular
QRE is a reduced form approach because Pi implies g(¹ ¼i;²i) and the distribution of
²i. GHP place restrictions directly on the response functions of regular QRE that
ensure representation of boundedly rational choice behavior. A strategy pro¯le ¾ is
a regular QRE if and only if Pi(¹ ¼i(¾¡i)) = ¾i for all i = 1;:::;n.
The canonical quantal response function based on multiplicative error is the power










where ¹ ¸ 0 is a constant determining players's discrimination ability. As ¹ ! 0
the probability of all players playing their best response goes to one. McKelvey and
Palfrey prove, for logit response functions, that there is generically a unique branch of
the equilibrium correspondence based on the discrimination parameter that contains
the unique regular QRE under no discrimination and a perfect discrimination QRE
that is also a Nash equilibrium. This branch can be thought of as representing a
learning process that leads to a unique Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows a simple three-player coordination game ¡2. The strategy pro¯les
(U;L;W) and (D;R;E) are both Nash equilibria. The QRE equilibrium using the
power response function is (U;L;W) when x = 0. However, increasing all of player
3's payo®s by one by setting x = 1 leads to the selection of (D;R;E). This apparent
translation dependence disappears if response probabilities in eq. 4 are determined
by marginal utilities. Basis and not translation dependence appears in the quantal
power response function.
Proposition 4.2 All quantal response functions using marginal utilities, payo®s rel-
ative to basis utilities, are translation invariant.
5 Focal Points, Monotonicity and Pure Bargaining
This section completes the presentation of pure bargaining results and provides some
interpretation. Equal split is ¯rst characterized in proper pure bargaining games.
5.1 Equal split in general pure bargaining games
De¯nition 5.1 Let B = (»;d;S) be an n-player pure bargaining game. Consider a
set xi 2 S, i = 1:::;n and a y 2 RN. For any i, let xi 2 S maximize xi
i subject to
the further restriction that xi
j ¸ yj for all j 6= i. Then the maximal aspirations point
relative to y is My = M(y;S) = (x1;:::;xn). De¯ne M» = M(»;S) as the »-maximal
aspirations point of B and Md = M(d;S) as the d-maximal aspirations point of B.
The »-maximal aspirations point shows the most a player can receive when all
other players receive at least their basis utility. The standard d-maximal aspirations
point represents the most a player can receive when all others receive at least their
disagreement payo®s.
16De¯nition 5.2 Let B = (»;d;S) and B¤ = (»;d;T) have a common maximal as-
pirations reference point y. A solution F is restricted monotonic if and only if
My = M(y;S) = M(y;T) and S ½ T imply that F(B¤) ¸ F(B).
Restricted monotonicity weakens the de¯nition of monotonicity (def. 3.9) by re-
quiring that two feasibility sets share the same maximal aspirations point.
Theorem 5.1 The equal split solution is the unique solution for the game B =
(»;d;S) that is e±cient (def. 3.3), symmetric (def. 3.2), a±ne transformation in-
variant (def. 3.7), restrictedly monotonic (def. 5.2), and shows noncomparability of
disagreement payo®s and comparability of M» = M(»;S) (see def. 3.1).
Proof: Normalize B so that »¤ = 0N and M¤
» = 1N and de¯ne c = maxfcj c1N 2 S¤g.
Let ¼i be an n-vector with ¼i
i = 1, and ¼i
j = 0 for i 6= j. De¯ne T to be the compre-
hensive set based on the convex hull generated by the points fc1N;¼1;¼2;:::;¼ng.
By symmetry cN = F(0N;1N;T). Restricted monotonicity then requires that cN =
F(0N;1N;S¤) as well. ¤
The equal split solution is the point on the line between » and M» that intersects
the e±cient surface of S. The sense of equality in the general equal split solution
is in the nature of a proportionality property. Consider the range from any player's
maximal expectations to their basis utility. Each player loses relative to maximal
aspirations or gains relative to basis utility in equal proportion.
Proposition 5.1 Let x = ES(»;d;S) be the equal split solution, let b be the »-







= 1 ¡ k; i = 1;2;:::;n:
5.2 Monotonic solutions
Equal split is a direct variation on the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solution. Basis
utility replaces the disagreement point and »-maximal aspirations replace d-maximal
aspirations. There is an analog to proposition 5.1 for Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining.
Thus equal split, Kalai-Smorodinsky and proportional bargaining are all monotonic
and have proportional qualities. The relationship between monotonicity and pro-
portionality shown by Kalai (1977) also appears in these endogenously proportional
solutions. However, Kalai's (1975) solutions are homogeneous and not translation
invariant because the exogenous proportionality vector is translation dependent.
There is an essential similarity between equal split, Kalai-Smorodinsky and pro-
portional bargaining. Given e±ciency, symmetry, transformation invariance and the
17appropriate monotonicity axiom, the salience of any two reference points identi¯es a
solution. These solutions are intuitive. Two points determine a line. The solution is
the intersection of this line with the e±cient bargaining surface. Monotonicity merely
identi¯es this intersection mathematically. This simplicity can seem like a weakness.
There is little subtlety and no sense of marginal equilibrium. However, this simplicity
is likely a strength. Schelling writes
[G]ame characteristics that are relevant to sophisticated mathematical
solutions ... might not have the power of focusing expectations and in°u-
encing the outcome ... except when the same solution can be reached by
an alternative less sophisticated route. (1960:113, edited)
Indeed, the less sophisticated the nonmathematical route, the greater the power of
focusing expectations might reasonably be. The salience of two reference points makes
a monotonic solution a focal point.
5.3 Pure bargaining choices
Section 5.2 provides a reference-point based approach focusing expectations in bar-
gaining. Given such a focus, bargaining mechanisms consistent with these expecta-
tions might then be favored. If the salience of only the disagreement point is thought
to guide or allow expectations to move toward Nash bargaining, this approach be-
comes more complete.
Figure 4 illustrates another approach to solution selection, one based on the char-
acteristics of bargaining outcomes. The primary choice is between equal and propor-
tional gain. There is no `soft' variant of proportional pure bargaining because the
disagreement point is essential to proportional outcomes. The next choice is then
between the soft and hard variants of equal gain bargaining, with equal split being
the soft bargaining solution. There are two variants of equality-based hard bargain-
ing. Monotonic Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining provides gains that are in strict equal
proportion relative to the disagreement and maximal aspirations points. IIA-based
Nash outcomes deviate from this strict equality when and to the extent that doing
so will increase the product of player's payo®s relative to the disagreement point.
The nature of noncooperative implementations provides the last approach to com-
paring pure bargaining models. Nash bargaining results when players have equal
participation in the game (e.g., Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Hart
and Mas-Colell (1996)). Theorem 4.1 and Feldman (2002) show that proportional
bargaining results when players's probability of proposing is proportional to their
expected payo®. Moulin (1984) shows that Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining can be
implemented in a game where players ¯rst bid probabilities for the right to propose,
the player with the highest bid proposes ¯rst and the second player has the right to
make a last countero®er with the probability of the winning bid. Finally, Huck and
18Oechssler (1999) ¯nd equal split is the equilibrium outcome in an evolutionary setting
and Lopomo and Huck (2001) ¯nd equal split in cases of interdependent preferences.
None of these models can be considered inherently more rational than the others, but
each has aspects that make it more relevant to particular bargaining environments.
6 Conclusion
Recognition of basis utility expands pure bargaining theory with two new endogenous
proportional solutions. Equal split provides a model of commonly observed experi-
mental outcomes. Pure proportional bargaining is the pure bargaining version of the
TU proportional value of Ortmann (2000) and the NTU proportional value of Feldman
(1999, 2002). With the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution they form a
versatile family of monotonic pure bargaining models. Basis utility also allows moves
of nature in noncooperative games, such as the selection of proposers and trembles,
to be conditioned on payo®s without creating translation invariant equilibria.
Endogenous proportionality was lost to game theory without basis utility, which
was obscured in part by the mechanics of translation invariance. Basis utility ex-
pands the range of interpersonal comparisons that can be made in the expected utility
framework beyond those of Kalai (1977) and Myerson (1977). Thompson's (1998:197)
negotiation text sees consensus interpersonal comparison and proportionality as \the
heart of equity theory." Proportionality, here, should be taken in the sense of the
ratios of Kalai (1977) and propositions 2.2 and 5.1 and not simply proportional bar-
gaining. This is not a new idea. Moulin (1999) quotes Aristotle in his survey of social
choice allocation rules: \Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally
in proportion to relevant similarities and di®erences."
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Table 1: Bargaining example from Nash (1950).
21Figure 1: Nash (1950) example normalized and including basis
utility point » = (¡1;¡1:2).
22Figure 2: Coordination game ¡2.
23Figure 3: Quantal response graph for ¡2 showing apparent trans-
lation dependence.
24Figure 4: Tree of IIA and monotonic bargaining solutions.
25